# Volume Imbalance and Algorithmic Trading 

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## Outline

- The limit order book.
- Volume order imbalance as an indicator of market behaviour.
- Imbalance model and market model.
- Optimal trading problem.
- The value of knowing imbalance.


## The Limit Order Book

- The limit order book is a record of collective interest to buy or sell certain quantities of an asset at a certain price.

| Buy Orders |  |  | Sell Orders |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Price | Volume |  | Price | Volume |
| 60.00 | 80 |  | 60.10 | 75 |
| 59.90 | 100 |  | 60.20 | 75 |
| 59.80 | 90 |  | 60.30 | 50 |

- Graphical representation of the limit order book:



## Market Orders

- An incoming market order lifts limit orders from the book.



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## Agent's Goal

- Optimally place limit orders in the limit order book (LOB)



## Agent's Goal

Optimally placing limit orders in the limit order book requires the agent to specify dynamics of the market, namely:

- Dynamics of the midprice.
- Dynamics of the spread.
- Dynamics of incoming market buy and sell orders.
- Interaction between the agent's limit orders and incoming market orders.


## Models from previous literature

- Avellaneda and Stoikov (2008): midprice is BM, trades arrive according to Poisson process, exponential fill rate.
- Cartea and Jaimungal (2012): midprice jumps due to market orders, introduce risk control via inventory penalisation.
- Fodra and Labadie (2012): midprice follows a diffusion process with general local drift and volatility terms, Poisson arrivals, exponential fill rate.
- Guilbaud and Pham (2013): discrete spread modelled as Markov chain, independent Levy process midprice, inventory penalisation.
- Guéant, Lehalle, and Fernandez-Tapia (2013): midprice is BM, trades arrive according to Poisson process, exponential fill rate.
- Cartea, Jaimungal, and Ricci (2014): multi-factor mutually-exciting process jointly models arrivals, fill probabilities, and midprice drift.


## Volume Order Imbalance

## Volume Order Imbalance

- Volume order imbalance is the proportion of best interest on the bid side.
- Defined as:

$$
I_{t}=\frac{V_{t}^{b}}{V_{t}^{b}+V_{t}^{a}} .
$$

- $V_{t}^{b}$ is the volume at the best bid at time $t$.
- $V_{t}^{a}$ is the volume at the best ask at time $t$.
- $I_{t} \in[0,1]$.


## Predictive Power of Volume Imbalance - MO type

- Consider the types of market orders that are placed depending on the level of imbalance.
- More market buys when imbalance is high, more market sells when imbalance is low.


Figure: BBBY: one day of NASDAQ trades. Imbalance ranges are $[0,0.35),[0.35,0.65]$, and $(0.65,1]$.

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## Volume Imbalance and Midprice Change

## Predictive Power of Volume Imbalance - Midprice Change

- Distribution of midprice change 20 ms after a market order.


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Where to post in the LOB?

## Tick Activity

- Number of market orders that take place at ticks from midprice.


Figure: BBBY: one day of NASDAQ trades.

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Figure: TEVA: one day of NASDAQ trades.

## Market Model

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- Rather than model imbalance directly, a finite state imbalance regime process is considered, $Z_{t} \in\left\{1, \ldots, n_{Z}\right\}$.
- $Z_{t}$ will act as an approximation to the true value of imbalance.
- The interval $[0,1]$ is subdivided in to $n_{Z}$ subintervals. $Z_{t}=k$ corresponds to $I_{t}$ lying within the $k^{\text {th }}$ subinterval.
- The spread $\Delta_{t}$ also takes values in a finite state space, $\Delta_{t} \in\left\{1, \ldots, n_{\Delta}\right\}$.


## Market Model

- Let $\mu, \mu^{+}$, and $\mu^{-}$be three doubly stochastic Poisson random measures.
- $M_{t}^{+}$and $M_{t}^{-}$, the number of market buy and sell orders up to time $t$, are given by:

$$
M_{t}^{ \pm}=\int_{0}^{t} \int_{\bar{y} \in \mathbb{R}^{3}} \mu^{ \pm}(d \bar{y}, d u)
$$

- The midprice, $S_{t}$, together with $Z_{t}$ and $\Delta_{t}$ are modelled as:

$$
\begin{aligned}
S_{t} & =S_{0}+\int_{0}^{t} \int_{\bar{y} \in \mathbb{R}^{3}} y_{1}\left(\mu+\mu^{+}-\mu^{-}\right)(d \bar{y}, d u) \\
Z_{t} & =Z_{0}+\int_{0}^{t} \int_{\bar{y} \in \mathbb{R}^{3}}\left(y_{2}-Z_{u^{-}}\right)\left(\mu+\mu^{+}+\mu^{-}\right)(d \bar{y}, d u) \\
\Delta_{t} & =\Delta_{0}+\int_{0}^{t} \int_{\bar{y} \in \mathbb{R}^{3}}\left(y_{3}-\Delta_{u^{-}}\right)\left(\mu+\mu^{+}+\mu^{-}\right)(d \bar{y}, d u)
\end{aligned}
$$

## Main features of this model

- All three $\mu^{i}$ are conditionally independent given $\left(Z_{t}, \Delta_{t}\right)$ and have compensators of the form:

$$
\nu^{i}(d \bar{y}, d t)=\lambda^{i}\left(Z_{t}, \Delta_{t}\right) F_{Z_{t}, \Delta_{t}}^{i}(d \bar{y}) d t
$$

- This makes the joint process $\left(Z_{t}, \Delta_{t}\right)$ a continuous-time Markov chain.
- $\lambda^{ \pm}(Z, \Delta)$ and $F_{Z, \Delta}^{ \pm}(d \bar{y})$ are chosen to reflect realistic dependence between market order arrivals, volume imbalance, spread changes, and midprice changes.
- $F_{Z, \Delta}$ is chosen to have support only on $y_{1}= \pm \frac{y_{3}-\Delta}{2}$. Limit order activity must change the midprice and spread simultaneously.


## Agent's Wealth and Inventory

- The agent may post bid and ask orders at the touch.
- Wealth has dynamics:

$$
d X_{t}=\gamma_{t}^{+}\left(S_{t^{-}}+\frac{\Delta_{t^{-}}}{2}\right) d M_{t}^{+}-\gamma_{t}^{-}\left(S_{t^{-}}-\frac{\Delta_{t^{-}}}{2}\right) d M_{t}^{-}
$$

where $\gamma_{t}^{ \pm} \in\{0,1\}$ are the agent's control processes.

- Inventory has dynamics:

$$
d q_{t}=-\gamma_{t}^{+} d M_{t}^{+}+\gamma_{t}^{-} d M_{t}^{-}
$$

- Controls $\gamma_{t}^{ \pm}$are chosen such that inventory is constrained, $\underline{Q} \leq q_{t} \leq \bar{Q}$.


## Optimal Trading

## The Optimal Trading Problem

- The agent attempts to maximize expected terminal wealth:

$$
H(t, x, q, S, Z, \Delta)=\sup _{\left(\gamma_{t}^{ \pm}\right) \in \mathcal{A}} \mathbb{E}\left[X_{T}+q_{T}\left(S_{T}-\ell\left(q_{T}\right)\right) \mid \mathcal{F}_{t}\right]
$$

- This value function has associated equation:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \partial_{t} H+\lambda(Z, \Delta) \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{D} H \mid Z, \Delta] \\
+ & \sup _{\gamma^{+} \in\{0,1\}} \lambda^{+}(Z, \Delta) \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{D}^{+} H \mid Z, \Delta\right] \\
+\sup _{\gamma^{-} \in\{0,1\}} \lambda^{-}(Z, \Delta) \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{D}^{-} H \mid Z, \Delta\right] & =0 \\
H(T, x, q, S, Z) & =x+q(S-\ell(q)) .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Value Function Ansatz

- Making the ansatz $H(t, x, q, S, Z, \Delta)=x+q S+h(t, q, Z, \Delta)$ allows for a corresponding equation for $h$ to be written:

$$
\begin{array}{r}
\partial_{t} h+\lambda(Z, \Delta)(q \epsilon(Z, \Delta)+\Sigma(t, q, Z, \Delta)) \\
+\sup _{\gamma^{+} \in\{0,1\}} \lambda^{+}(Z, \Delta)\left(\gamma^{+} \frac{\Delta}{2}+\left(q-\gamma^{+}\right) \epsilon^{+}(Z, \Delta)+\Sigma_{\gamma^{+}}^{+}(t, q, Z, \Delta)\right) \\
+\sup _{\gamma^{-} \in\{0,1\}} \lambda^{-}(Z, \Delta)\left(\gamma^{-} \frac{\Delta}{2}-\left(q+\gamma^{-}\right) \epsilon^{-}(Z, \Delta)+\Sigma_{\gamma^{-}}^{-}(t, q, Z, \Delta)\right)=0 \\
h(T, q, Z, \Delta)=-q \ell(q)
\end{array}
$$

- This is a system of ODE's of dimension $n_{Z} n_{\Delta}(\bar{Q}-\underline{Q}+1)$.


## Feedback Controls

- Feedback controls can be written as:

$$
\gamma^{ \pm}(t, q, Z, \Delta)= \begin{cases}1, & \frac{\Delta}{2}-\epsilon^{ \pm}(Z, \Delta)+\Sigma_{1}^{ \pm}(t, q, Z, \Delta)>\Sigma_{0}^{ \pm}(t, q, Z, \Delta) \\ 0, & \frac{\Delta}{2}-\epsilon^{ \pm}(Z, \Delta)+\Sigma_{1}^{ \pm}(t, q, Z, \Delta) \leq \Sigma_{0}^{ \pm}(t, q, Z, \Delta)\end{cases}
$$

where

$$
\begin{aligned}
\epsilon^{ \pm}(Z, \Delta) & =\sum_{y_{1}, y_{2}, y_{3}} y_{1} F_{Z, \Delta}^{ \pm}\left(y_{1}, y_{2}, y_{3}\right) \\
\Sigma_{\gamma^{ \pm}}^{ \pm}(t, q, Z, \Delta) & =\sum_{y_{1}, y_{2}, y_{3}}\left(h\left(t, q \mp \gamma^{ \pm}, y_{2}, y_{3}\right)-h(t, q, Z, \Delta)\right) F_{z, \Delta}^{ \pm}\left(y_{1}, y_{2}, y_{3}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

## Optimal Trading Strategy - Parameters

- Allow three possible states of imbalance: $Z_{t} \in\{1,2,3\}$
- Two possible spreads: $\Delta_{t} \in\{1,2\}$
- MO arrival rates and price impact account for imbalance. In matrices rows are spread ( $n_{\Delta}=2$ ) and columns are imbalance states $\left(n_{Z}=3\right)$

$$
\begin{array}{lll}
\bar{\lambda}^{+}=\left(\begin{array}{lll}
0.050 & 0.091 & 0.242 \\
0.057 & 0.051 & 0.095
\end{array}\right) & \bar{\varepsilon}^{+}=\left(\begin{array}{lll}
0.247 & 0.556 & 0.710 \\
0.539 & 0.959 & 1.036 \\
0.242 & 0.091 & 0.050 \\
0.095 & 0.051 & 0.057
\end{array}\right) & \bar{\varepsilon}^{-}=\left(\begin{array}{lll}
0.710 & 0.556 & 0.247 \\
1.036 & 0.959 & 0.539
\end{array}\right)
\end{array}
$$

- Terminal penalty function chosen to be $\ell(q, \Delta)=0.005 q$.


## Optimal Trading Strategy - Limit Sell Orders



Low Imbalance


Low Imbalance


Middle Imbalance

$$
\Delta=1
$$



Middle Imbalance

$$
\Delta=2
$$



High Imbalance


High Imbalance

## Optimal Trading Strategy - Buy and Sell Boundaries




Middle Imbalance
$\Delta=1$


Low Imbalance


Middle Imbalance

$$
\Delta=2
$$



High Imbalance


High Imbalance

## The Value of Knowing Imbalance

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- The number of imbalance regimes is an important modelling choice.
- A large number of regimes can begin to cause observation and parameter estimation problems.
- A small number of regimes will not benefit as much from the predictive information.
- How does the performance of an agent depend on the number imbalance regimes in the model?


## Simulation Procedure

- One day of data is simulated according to the model with $n_{Z}=8$.
- These data are used to estimate parameters of the model when $n_{Z}=1,2,4$, and 8 by collapsing observable imbalance states together.
- The "optimal" strategy is computed for each of these four choices of $n_{Z}$.
- Ten minutes of data are simulated according to the original model ( $n_{Z}=8$ ), and each trading strategy's performance is tested against it (plus two additional "naive" strategies).
- The previous step is repeated 50,000 times to get a distribution of performance results.


## Simulation Results



Figure : Distribution of terminal wealth for varying observable levels of imbalance and $\bar{Q}=-\underline{Q}=5$. Data generating parameters estimated from BBBY.

## Simulation Results



Figure: Expectation vs. Standard Deviation for varying observable levels of imbalance. Maximum inventory $Q=\bar{Q}=-\underline{Q}$ ranges from 1 to 25 . Data generating parameters estimated from BBBY.

## Simulation Results



Figure : Distribution of terminal wealth for varying observable levels of imbalance and $\bar{Q}=-\underline{Q}=5$. Data generating parameters estimated from MSFT.

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Figure: Expectation vs. Standard Deviation for varying observable levels of imbalance. Maximum inventory $Q=\bar{Q}=-Q$ ranges from 1 to 25 . Data generating parameters estimated from TEVA.

## Conclusions

- The willingness of an agent to post limit orders is strongly dependent on the value of imbalance.
- Agent's should post buy orders more aggressively and sell orders more conservatively when imbalance is high. This reflects taking advantage of short term speculation and protecting against adverse selection.
- Corresponding opposite behaviour applies when imbalance is low.
- The additional value of being able to more accurately observe imbalance appears to have diminishing returns, but initially the additional value is very steep.


## Future Endeavours

- Backtest strategies on real data.
- Investigate the effects of latency with respect to observing imbalance and spread.
- Expand the agent's controls to allow multiple limit order postings at different prices and of different volumes.
- Incorporate more realistic interactions between market orders and the agent's limit orders (i.e. queueing priority and partial fills).


# Thanks for your attention! 

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Figure: Distribution of midprice changes 20 ms after a market buy order. Data is taken from a full month of trading (January 2011).

## Simulation Parameters

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \hline \lambda_{\Delta}=(0.119,0.472) \quad \lambda_{\Delta}^{ \pm}=(0.069,0.030) \\
& \hline \lambda_{Z}=(0.97,0.83,0.89,1.18,1.18,0.89,0.83,0.97) \\
& \hline \lambda_{Z}^{+}=(0.025,0.025,0.035,0.041,0.055,0.073,0.109,0.186) \\
& \hline \lambda_{Z}^{-}=(0.186,0.109,0.073,0.055,0.041,0.035,0.025,0.025) \\
& \hline \hline \epsilon_{\Delta}=(0,0) \quad \epsilon_{\Delta}^{ \pm}=(0.556,0.749) \\
& \hline \epsilon_{Z}=(-0.254,-0.084,-0.041,-0.008,0.008,0.041,0.084,0.254) \\
& \hline \epsilon_{Z}^{+}=(0.349,0.333,0.405,0.432,0.512,0.550,0.665,0.854) \\
& \hline \epsilon_{Z}^{-}=(0.854,0.665,0.550,0.512,0.432,0.405,0.333,0.349) \\
& \hline
\end{aligned}
$$

Table: Estimated parameters for BBBY.

## Simulation Parameters

| $\lambda_{\Delta}=(0.050,4.649) \quad \lambda_{\Delta}^{ \pm}=(0.172,0.521)$ |
| :--- |
| $\lambda_{Z}=(1.43,0.96,0.71,0.53,0.53,0.71,0.96,1.43)$ |
| $\lambda_{Z}^{+}=(0.027,0.033,0.044,0.056,0.094,0.210,0.535,1.565)$ |
| $\lambda_{Z}^{-}=(1.565,0.535,0.210,0.094,0.056,0.044,0.033,0.027)$ |
| $\epsilon_{\Delta}=(0,0) \quad \epsilon_{\Delta}^{ \pm}=(0.277,0.229)$ |
| $\epsilon_{Z}=(-0.234,-0.012,-0.008,-0.004,0.004,0.008,0.012,0.234)$ |
| $\epsilon_{Z}^{+}=(0.074,0.148,0.119,0.152,0.123,0.227,0.248,0.436)$ |
| $\epsilon_{Z}^{-}=(0.436,0.248,0.227,0.123,0.152,0.119,0.148,0.074)$ |

Table : Estimated parameters for MSFT.

## Simulation Parameters

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \hline \lambda_{\Delta}=(0.225,0.846) \quad \lambda_{\Delta}^{ \pm}=(0.117,0.049) \\
& \hline \lambda_{Z}=(1.62,1.67,1.81,2.20,2.20,1.81,1.67,1.62) \\
& \hline \lambda_{Z}^{+}=(0.044,0.050,0.060,0.066,0.086,0.119,0.171,0.331) \\
& \hline \lambda_{Z}^{-}=(0.331,0.171,0.119,0.086,0.066,0.060,0.050,0.044) \\
& \hline \hline \epsilon_{\Delta}=(0,0) \quad \epsilon_{\Delta}^{ \pm}=(0.534,0.716) \\
& \hline \epsilon_{Z}=(-0.252,-0.084,-0.035,-0.006,0.006,0.035,0.084,0.251) \\
& \hline \epsilon_{Z}^{+}=(0.252,0.329,0.445,0.479,0.471,0.541,0.603,0.752) \\
& \hline \epsilon_{Z}^{-}=(0.752,0.603,0.541,0.471,0.479,0.445,0.329,0.252) \\
& \hline
\end{aligned}
$$

Table : Estimated parameters for TEVA.

